

# TAMAÑOS DE MERCADO ASIMÉTRICOS Y POLÍTICA INDUSTRIAL

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## ASYMMETRIES IN MARKET SIZES AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY

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## **RESUMEN**

En nuestro artículo presentamos un modelo simple que permite a ambos, reguladores y empresas actuar estratégicamente. Consideramos dos industrias en las que sólo hay dos productores de un bien determinado. Cada productor está situado en un país diferente.

Cada productor produce dos variedades del bien: una para el propio país y otra para el país extranjero. Asumimos competencia a la Cournot en el mercado doméstico y en el extranjero para cada variedad del producto. Los resultados de nuestro trabajo muestran la importancia de las asimetrías de mercado en la determinación de la política industrial/ambiental óptima en un entorno en el que tanto las empresas como los reguladores actúan estratégicamente. Encontramos que el aumento de la diferencia en el tamaño del mercado entre los dos países da incentivos para que los gobiernos pasen de aplicar impuestos a las emisiones a aplicar subsidios a la producción.

## **ABSTRACT**

In our paper we present a simple model that allows both, regulators and firms to act strategically. Consider two industries in which there are only two producers of a given good. Each producer is located in a different country. Each producer produces two varieties of the good: one for the home country and another one for the foreign country. We assume Cournot competition in the home and foreign markets of each product variety. The findings of our paper show the important role of market size asymmetry in determining optimal industrial/environmental policy in a setting where both firms and regulators act strategically. We find that increasing the difference in the market size between the two countries gives incentives to the governments to move from emission taxes to production subsidies.

## **PALABRAS CLAVE**

Impuestos sobre emisiones, subsidios a la producción, países heterogéneos, mercados imperfectos, I + D ambiental

## **KEY WORDS**

Emission taxes, production subsidies, heterogeneous countries, imperfect markets, environmental R&D

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